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Last updated: 21/1/07 |
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COMBATING |
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ANTI-CATHOLIC AGITPROP |
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– FROM THE TRICKS AND FALLACIES OF ARGUMENT |
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TO THE STRATEGIES OF 'BRAINWASHING' |
Kevin O'Neill, LLB(Hons), MSc
CONTENTS
I.1. Using an argument of logically unsound form
II.1. Using a biased sample
II.2. Using inconsequent argument
II.3. Recommending a position because it is a mean between two extremes
II.4. Pointing out the logical correctness of the form of an argument whose premisses contain doubtful or untrue statements
II.5. Argument in a circle
II.6. Begging the question
II.7. Putting forward a tautology, such as that too much of the thing attacked is bad ('too much' is already, by definition, in excess of what is acceptable) as if it were a factual judgement
II.8. Using a speculative argument
II.9. Appealing to ignorance
II.10. Using a dilemma which ignores a continuous series of possibilities between the two extremes presented
II.11. Using the fact of continuity between them to throw doubt on a real difference between two things
II.12. Illegitimately using, or demanding, definition
II.13. Using questions designed to draw out self-incriminating statements that are false
II.14. Arguing by mere analogy
II.15. Arguing by forced analogy
II.16. Using the fallacy of non-essence
II.17. Using a restricted range of sources of information
II.18. Presenting a false dichotomy
II.19. Using a non sequitur
II.20. Using vicious abstraction
III. Fallacies of Relevance: A. Credibility
III.A.1. Attributing prejudices or motives to one's opponent
III.A.2. Alleging or proving hypocrisy
III.A.3. Using abusive personal (ad hominem) attacks
III. Fallacies of Relevance: B. Confusion
III.B.1. Making a statement in which 'all' is implied but only 'some' is true
III.B.2. Extending an opponent's proposition by contradicting or misrepresenting it
III.B.3. Evading a sound refutation of an argument by using a sophistical formula
III.B.4. Diverting to another question, to a side issue, or making an irrelevant objection
III.B.5. Using a red herring
III.B.6. Using humorous diversion or satire
III.B.7. Discussing a verbal proposition (i.e. disputing the meaning of a word) as if it were a question of fact, or failing to disentangle the verbal and factual elements in a proposition
III.B.8. Changing the meaning of a term during the course of an argument
III.B.9. Using amphiboly
III.B.10. Making a false emphasis
III. Fallacies of Relevance: C. Manipulation
III.C.1. Using emotionally toned words
III.C.2. Arguing that we should not make efforts against X which is admittedly evil because there is a worse evil Y against which our efforts should be directed
III.C.3. Suggesting a proposition by mere repetition of it
III.C.4. Suggesting a proposition merely by stating it in a confident manner
III.C.5. Suggesting a proposition merely by appealing to one's own or another's prestige
III.C.6. Appealing to attractiveness
III.C.7. Appealing to mere authority
III.C.8. Suggesting a proposition through the inducement of conflicting emotions
III.C.9. Suggesting a proposition by associative conditioning
III.C.10. Appealing to prestige through false credentials
III.C.11. Appealing to prestige through the use of pseudo-technical jargon
III.C.12. Affecting failure to understand, backed by prestige
III.C.13. Overcoming resistance to a doubtful proposition by a preliminary statement of a few easily accepted ones
III.C.14. Stating a doubtful proposition in such a way that it fits in with the thought-habits or the prejudices of the hearer
III.C.15. Using generally accepted formulae of predigested thought as premisses in argument
III.C.16. Appealing to a slogan or soundbite
III.C.17. Stating that 'There is much to be said on both sides, so no decision can be made either way', or using any other formula leading to the attitude of academic detachment
III.C.18. Angering an opponent in order that he may argue badly
III.C.19. Special pleading
III.C.20. Appealing to pity
III.C.21. Commending or condemning a proposition because of its practical consequences to the hearer
III.C.22. Peremptorily stifling the debate
III.C.22A. Proof by spiking one's opponent's guns
III.C.23. Appealing to force
III.C.24. Appealing to common practice
III.C.25. Appealing to novelty
III.C.26. Appealing to terror
IV.1. Jumping to a conclusion
IV.2. Identifying a false cause
IV.3. Misapplying a rule
IV.4. Committing the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc
IV.5. Committing the fallacy of composition
IV.6. Committing the fallacy of division
Appendix I. Sample exercises (with suggested analyses)
The first rule one should always remember when entering into debate with anti-Catholics (on any subject) is that, in human disputation, the argument does not exist which can compel your opponent to agree with you. Your conclusions may be logically sound or your inferences highly probable, nevertheless, your opponent, because of his innate free-will, can always say: “You're wrong!”
In the early twentieth century, ideologists openly expressed their delight in violent irrationality, as is illustrated in this dialogue by the French Fascist author George Valois, from his Revolution Nationale:
“To the bourgeois brandishing his contracts and statistics:
– Two plus three makes. . .
– Nought, the Barbarian replies, smashing his head in.”1
Less overtly brutal tactics (but brutal nonetheless), adopted by anti-Catholics, work at the psychological level to undermine the Catholic's self-confidence, before he or she even begins to reason or debate on a particular subject.
Such tactics are described in detail by two authors, Marshall Kirk and Hunter Madsen, in their work After the Ball (Plume, 1989), the purpose of which is to explain how to use psychology to neutralise people's innate disapproval of sodomy2. It is worth quoting from them at length in this preface:
“[O]ur effect is achieved without reference to facts, logic, or proof. . . . [T]hrough repeated infralogical emotional conditioning, . . . [a person's beliefs] can be alloyed . . . whether he is conscious of the attack or not. Indeed, the more he is distracted by any incidental, even specious, surface arguments, the less conscious he'll be of the true nature of the process – which is all to the good.
In short, Jamming succeeds insofar as it inserts even a slight frisson of doubt . . . into the previously [held opinions regarding sodomy]. The approach can be quite useful and effective – if our message can get the massive exposure upon which all else depends”3.
We will meet these authors again when we come to discuss in detail those debating tricks specifically designed to achieve their effect through emotional, “infralogical” manipulation.
Purpose of this Guide
The purpose of this guide is not to provide instruction in Catholic apologetics, but to prepare Catholics for the tricks, ploys and outright hostility of our opponents. It is worth remembering that the obligation to use reason in argument is itself a moral value judgment, predicated on Christian love of neighbour. Not everyone, however, is prepared to listen to reason at all, let alone to dispute fairly and rationally. As Aristotle, traditionally called the “father of logic”, remarks: “Do not argue with every one . . . for there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate4” (The Topics, Book VIII, c.14).
The following pages present a list of tricks and fallacies of dishonest argument, as well as some techniques which are specifically designed to 'brainwash' potential opponents (this word is not used lightly). Each description is hopefully sufficiently self-contained that this guide may be used as a quick reference, though it is also hoped that a readable flow of material is presented from start to finish.
Definition of “good argument”
Before we begin, however, it is worth reminding ourselves just what constitutes a good, rational argument. For this purpose, the following definition from his book, Simple Logic, by University of Texas professor of philosophy, Daniel Bonevac, is as good as any:
“A good argument generally presents premisses which are relevant to providing evidence for a conclusion which logically follows from those premisses.”5
On the need to eliminate tricks and fallacies to arrive at clear argument, the following observation is also apposite:
“It is only when we have cleared away irrelevancies such as emotional thinking, biased sampling, inappropriate analogies, etc., that we can see clearly the underlying case and make a sound judgment as to whether it is right or wrong.”6
I.1. Using an argument of logically unsound form7. (top)
This is dealt with by clearly laying out the form of your opponent's argument – perhaps through drawing a diagram – so that its unsoundness is made obvious.
Example I.1.a
(From Steven T. Katz, “Quantity and Interpretation – Issues in the Comparative Historical Analysis of the Holocaust”, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol.4, No.2, p.145, 1989):
“Certain supporters of [legalised sodomy] have gone so far as to assign [persons accused of sodomy] the preeminent 'outsider position in the Nazi hierarchy, lower even than the racial antagonism engendered by the Jews'. Thus, for example, in [the play] Bent, the playwright has one of the two main protagonists survive by 'trading up' his pink badge worn by [persons accused of sodomy] for a yellow star of David.”
[Note: The relevance of this example to the subject of anti-Catholic agitprop was demonstrated in Britain in November 2003, when the Anglican Bishop of Chester was subjected to a criminal investigation for suggesting that persons who are in the habit of committing sodomy could break that habit. More recently, broadcaster Lynette Burrows is reported to have been the subject of a similarly sinister police inquiry. Another such incident has been reported in The Times. With the introduction into our criminal justice system of, amongst other things, the European arrest warrant, it is also important to be aware of comparative developments just across the English Channel. See example III.B.7.a in this document for related information. Update (12/1/06) – On it goes. (13/1/06/) – Even “horsing around” is having its consequences. The strategy just gets nastier (10/6/06) – as does the propaganda (19/7/06). Welcome to Airstrip One, centre for thought reform (2/9/06), where resistance is “futile” (7/9/06), Big Brother is watching you (26/12/06), and no-one in authority will admit that the basis of this actual totalitarian regime (28/12/06) is the fallacy described in this section. Would anyone expect to be “hauled before the courts” for equating Catholic priests with paedophiles (see, for example, point III.C.16 below)?
In After the Ball, Kirk and Madsen call for activists for the legalisation of sodomy to “Jam [disapproval of sodomy] by linking it to Nazi horror”8 (authors' emphasis – see trick III.C.8). It should be noted that, in spite of the apparently extraordinary success of Kirk and Madsen's cynical strategising, it is quite possible that many advocates of sodomy, who may not have committed it themselves, are guilty of wilful self-delusion on the subject because they have determined a priori to deny the sinfulness of fornication, of which sodomy is a more emphatic form. Witness the following story of conversion from lust (3/7/07).]
The essence of the argument referred to above can be restated as follows to show its logical unsoundness:
All Jews imprisoned in Nazi camps wore badges identifying them as such;
All persons accused of sodomy imprisoned in Nazi camps wore badges identifying them as such; therefore,
Persons accused of sodomy were irrationally accused (like victims of Nazi racialism).
The unsoundness of this argument can be shown by substituting an alternative term that leads to a patently false conclusion:
All Jews imprisoned in Nazi camps wore badges identifying them as such;
All “professional” criminals imprisoned in Nazi camps wore (green) badges identifying them as such; therefore,
“Professional” criminals were irrationally accused (like victims of Nazi racialism).
In both of these arguments, the common term must be universal, i.e. it must implicitly include the word all, if the deduction is to be logically sound. In the second example, it is obviously not true that all prisoners required to wear badges were either all Jews or all criminals, therefore the fact that Jews and criminals shared this trait does not mean that the one class was identical to the other. Similarly, in the first example, it is not obvious that all prisoners who were accused of sodomy were not guilty in law of having committed that crime. (In following the logic here it is important not to fall victim to a red herring (III.B.5). The brutality of the Nazi camps is a separate issue which concerns the treatment of convicts. This is different from considering the nature of the offence with which they have been charged.)
To remove the logical flaw from this argument, it would have to be restated as follows:
All persons assigned classificatory badges in Nazi camps were irrationally accused;
All persons accused of sodomy in Nazi camps were assigned badges classifying them as such; therefore,
All persons accused of sodomy in Nazi camps were irrationally accused.
This is now a logically sound argument, but it is clear that the truth of its premisses has become much harder to prove, though not impossible:
“Kogon writes that “The Gestapo readily had recourse to the charge of [sodomy] if it was unable to find any pretext for proceeding against Catholic priests or irksome critics” (Kogon:44).”9
II.1. Using a biased sample (i.e. one that excludes evidence to the contrary). (top)
The question here is whether two things can genuinely be shown to have any statistical association. Use of a biased sample is dealt with by either filling in the missing numbers or pointing out that your opponent does not have them.
Example II.1.a
(From Anne Hendershott, The Politics of Deviance, Encounter Books, 2002, p.71 et seq.):
“Social scientist Philip Jenkins . . . [concludes] that “in reality, Catholic clergy are not necessarily represented in the sexual abuse phenomenon at a higher rate or even equal to their numbers in the clerical profession as a whole.” However, he believes that there are structural and organizational reasons that the Catholic Church should have produced a disproportionately high level of nationally reported scandals. Unlike a scandal in a Baptist congregation [whose preachers can marry], for instance, which would remain strictly localized because of the church's decentralized structure, a scandal in a Catholic parish, because of the hierarchy in which it exists, is immediately viewed as a generalized “Catholic” scandal. . . . Jenkins claims that it is because the Catholic Church, unlike less centralized churches, keeps records of isolated cases of abuse that it has faced this moral panic.”
(From The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich, (anonymous), Burns Oates, 1940, pp.295-6):
“In some cases it was clear that the defendants were aware of having acted contrary to the Currency Laws, and the offence was openly condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities. . . . [T]he Schwarze Korps [the weekly newspaper of the SS] contained the following passage:
“. . . It is our duty to point out to faithful German Catholics the gulf which exists between the moral teaching of the Church and its fulfilment by a large section of the priesthood. Nothing will prevent the National Socialist State from following the path which morality and law point out for it”. . . .
In many similar financial cases of embezzlement, etc., in which ordinary citizens and, more especially, members of the National Socialist Party were involved, the Nazi press reported nothing or practically nothing.”
II.2. Using inconsequent argument. (top)
This is dealt with by asking your opponent to explain the alleged connection between the premiss and the conclusion, regardless of any fear you might have of exposing your ignorance or lack of understanding of logic.
“[T]his is the trick of bringing in defence of a statement another statement which does not in fact prove it, trusting that one's opponent will not challenge the proof. This can often be ensured by making the supporting statement a reference to a learned theory of which one's opponent will be afraid to confess his ignorance, or, at any rate, making the supporting statement in a matter so obscure that one's opponent fears that it would show shameful ignorance if he confessed that he did not see the connection.”10
Example II.2.a
(From The American Spectator, September/October 2001):
[The following extract from the magazine's interview with Carver Mead, Professor of Engineering and Applied Science at California Institute of Technology, indirectly examines the 'scientific' foundations of the popular anti-theistic ploy of pretending that we cannot be certain about such important things as the existence of God and objective morality (a ploy which is often a prelude to then insisting on the objectivity of the anti-theist's own 'morality').
The anti-theist often uses various pseudo-intellectual arguments to support his claim that nothing outside our minds is knowable as it really is (see also example II.8.a). One of these fallacious arguments is grounded in a supposed principle of uncertainty which is said to have been demonstrated by experiments in quantum physics. Mead ridicules this argument by showing that it is in fact grounded in absurdity.]
Interviewer: “So how about “Schrodinger's cat” – the thought experiment he proposed to illustrate the impossible conundrum of quantum theory. The cat is in a closed box, with a quantum-based trigger that either does or does not release poison. . . . The standard quantum-theory answer . . . would be: “The cat has neither been killed nor not been killed until we look inside the box to see what happened.” In other words, reality is observer-dependent.
Mead: “The idea that the observation of some event makes it somehow more “real” became entrenched in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, and, like the other misconceptions, is said to be confirmed by experiment. Even the slightest reflection will show how silly it is. An observer is an assembly of atoms. What is different about the observer's atoms from those of any other object? What if the data are taken by computer? Do the events not happen until the scientist gets home from vacation and looks at the printout? It is ludicrous!”
II.3. Recommending a position because it is a mean between two extremes. (top)
This is dealt with by denying its validity as a means to finding the truth. We can do this most easily by identifying two alternative extremes between which our own position can be shown to be the moderate one.
“A second reason for distrusting this piece of crooked thinking is the fact that when we have two extreme positions and a middle one between them, the truth is just as likely to lie on one extreme as in the middle position.”11
Example II.3.a
(From Dennis Sewell, Catholics: Britain's Largest Minority, Penguin Books, 2001, p.166):
“[T]he description 'adultery' is attributed by the Church not only to the wrong inflicted by a man who betrays and deceives his wife when he conducts an illicit affair with his secretary; but also to the woman, cruelly deserted by her spouse a decade previously, who seeks comfort in the arms of a new lover. Anyone with any instinctive feel for Natural Law knows these 'sins' to be of a different order from one another. But by applying the same label, the Catholic Church can give the impression that it draws no such distinction.”
This statement employs a quintuple whammy of dishonest argument, including:
the blatant use of emotionally charged terms to incline the reader to the author's position (“inflicted”, “betray”, “deceive”, “illicit” on the one hand, “cruelly”, “comfort” and “lover” on the other – see trick III.C.1);
the description of the office affair as “illicit” is tautologous (trick II.7) – effectively it means that adultery is wrong when it is wrong;
the damning description of the office affair and the reference to Natural Law are used as per trick III.C.13;
the author makes an implicit distinction between 'sinful' adultery and 'sinless' adultery (trick II.18); and,
he concludes with the present trick by implying that his 'moderate' stance between the extremes of condemning all acts of adultery and not condemning adultery at all should be adopted by the Church.
While the other tricks are described elsewhere, the flaw of Sewell's 'moderation' argument can be demonstrated by suggesting an alternative moderate stance: Catholic chastity inside and outside of marriage as opposed to fornication on the one extreme and Puritanism on the other (see example II.4.a).
II.4. Pointing out the logical correctness of the form of an argument whose premisses contain doubtful or untrue statements. (top)
This is dealt with by ignoring the specious appeal of the argument's form, and pointing out instead the falsity of the propositions contained in its premisses.
(From Hilaire Belloc, The Great Heresies, TAN Books and Publishers, 1991, p.85):
“[O]ne thing the [Puritan] . . . has always felt . . . is, that matter . . . is subject to decay and is therefore evil. Our bodies are evil. Their appetites are evil. . . . Pretty well any physical pleasure . . . is evil.”
If we expand the Puritan view described above to show its full implication we arrive at the following statements:
All things that are subject to decay are evil;
Matter is subject to decay; therefore,
Matter is evil.
The fact that the conclusion follows from the premisses (i.e. that the argument is logically sound) says nothing of the truth or falsity of those premisses. The source of this way of thinking was an attempt to rationalise about the problem of evil. The person who ascribed to this way of thinking “was so overwhelmed by the experience or prospect of suffering and by the appalling fact that his nature was subject to mortality, that he took refuge in denying the omnipotent goodness of a Creator. He said that evil was at work in the universe just as much as good; the two principles were always fighting as equals one against the other” (ibid.). Obviously this is a proposition which a Catholic would wish to contest.
II.5. Argument in a circle. (top)
Both II.5 and II.6 are dealt with by simplifying your opponent's argument such that its flawed nature will be obvious.
“The general form of the argument in a circle is: 'P is true because of Q; Q is true because of P'. It is sometimes argued for example, that human action is not free because what happens in a choice between two actions (let us say, between running away and standing one's ground in danger) is that the stronger impulse (to stand one's ground, for example) overcomes the other. If we further ask how we know that the impulse to stand one's ground was the stronger, the reply is that it must be so because that is the behaviour which actually took place. The argument then reduces to the form: the impulse to stand still overcame the impulse to run away because it was the stronger impulse; it was the stronger impulse because it overcame the other – an entirely circular argument.”12
Example II.5.a
(From Joshua Muravchik, Heaven on Earth, Encounter Books, 2002, p.105 et seq.):
“More than fifty years had passed since Marx and Engels formulated their sociological forecast that the rich would become fewer, the poor poorer and the middle classes negligible. [Eduard] Bernstein [, who had become Engels' closest protégé, and produced volume four of “Marx's” Das Capital] observed that something nearly opposite had occurred: the rich were more numerous, as were the middle classes, and the poor were better off. . . . Indeed, as a result of research in economic history, it is now estimated that per capita income in Germany and England, adjusted for inflation, had roughly doubled [in the fifty years since] the publication of Communist Manifesto in 1848. . . . The criticism of Bernstein . . . [was] impassioned and voluminous but hardly dispositive. Plekhanov, an aristocrat with a Ph.D., sniffed that Bernstein lacked formal training in philosophy [see trick III.C.12]. . . . Other attacks . . . boiled down to the circular argument that Bernstein could not be right because if he was, then the movement had been mistaken in some of its cherished beliefs.”
II.6. Begging the question (i.e. the very question which is in dispute). (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out that the premisses include or presuppose the conclusion.
II.7. Putting forward a tautology, such as that too much of the thing attacked is bad ('too much' is already, by definition, in excess of what is acceptable) as if it were a factual judgement. (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out that the statement is a specious distraction, merely reaffirming its own truth.
Example II.7.a
(From Catholics: Britain's Largest Minority, p.166):
“Those who adopt the 'pick and mix' approach would probably agree that it is always and everywhere wrong cynically to exploit another person for the gratification of selfish and egotistical sexual urges. . . . But if you tell them 'Fornication is wrong', they will demand further and better particulars.”
This short statement incorporates a quadruple whammy of dishonest argument:
first, it uses the tautology of saying that it is wrong to do wrong;
it does this in order to commit trick III.C.13;
it then implies a false distinction between wrongness and fornication (trick II.18); and,
concludes by begging the question: what is fornication if it is not the exploitation of another person for the gratification of selfish and egotistical sexual urges (trick II.6)?
II.8. Using a speculative argument. (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out that positive truth cannot be inferred from mere hypothesis.
(From Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, II, xx, quoted in Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.38):
[The following passage examines another 'philosophical' foundation of the anti-theistic ploy of pretending that we cannot be certain about reality and therefore about the existence of God and objective morality. In this example, the anti-theist claims that nothing outside our minds is knowable as it really is, but only as a 'mirror' image produced in our minds by the operation of external objects on our senses. Eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid destroys this argument by showing that it is grounded not in proven fact but in pure speculation.]
“The most uninstructed peasant has as distinct a conception, and as firm a belief of the immediate objects of his senses, as the greatest philosopher; and with this he rests satisfied, giving himself no concern how he came by this conception and belief. But the philosopher is impatient to know how his conception of external objects, and his belief of their existence, is produced. This, I am afraid, is hid in impenetrable darkness. But where there is no knowledge, there is the more room for conjecture: and of this philosophers have always been very liberal. [T]he [notion] of modern philosophers [that the world outside ourselves is known to us only through mental 'mirror' images of what we see, is] the production of human fancy . . . invented to satisfy the eager desire of knowing how we perceive external objects; but [it is] deficient in the two essential characters of a true and [scientific] account of the phenomenon: for we neither have any evidence of their existence [i.e. the mental 'mirror' images]; nor, if they did exist, can it be shown how they would produce perception.”
II.9. Appealing to ignorance. (top)
There comes a point where the speculative argument trick degenerates into the fallacy known as the appeal to ignorance: If you cannot disprove something, it must be true.
II.10. Using a dilemma which ignores a continuous series of possibilities between the two extremes presented. (top)
This is dealt with by refusing to accept either of the presented alternatives, and pointing out instead that there is a continuity which has been ignored by your opponent. This can be emphasised by showing that the argument is equivalent to asking, 'Is this object black or white?', when it is actually grey.
(From Thomas Lessl, “Pop Science and False History”, New Oxford Review, June 2000):
“The absurdity of what the “Dark Ages” myth supposes never seems to dawn on the scientists who recite it: If medieval thought had been dominated by religious convictions that pointedly denied the very idea of science, why did the scientific revolution occur in the West?. . . . This conundrum is easily resolved once we realize that this popular conception of the Middle Ages is simply a fiction. The events of the 17th century that are collectively called the “scientific revolution” were really products of a much longer period of “scientific evolution,” an intellectual movement that was born in the very heart of medieval Europe. The science of Galileo and Newton was only possible because the scientific thinking of Aristotle had been so warmly received into Christian Europe centuries before. The discovery of Aristotle's work – and that of a number of other classical thinkers – made available to Christians the most sophisticated scientific thinking that had been developed up to that point in history. But rather than suppressing this information, as the popular legends would suggest, medieval scholars immediately went to work building upon it.”
II.11. Using the fact of continuity between them to throw doubt on a real difference between two things (the 'argument of the beard'). (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out that there is nevertheless a real difference, as there is, for example, between 'hot' and 'cold'.
“One may throw doubt on the reality of the difference between a bearded and a clean-shaven man by a process beginning with the question whether a man with one hair on his chin has a beard. The answer is clearly 'No'. Then one may ask whether with two hairs on his chin a man has a beard. Again the answer must be 'No'. So again with three, four, etc. At no point can our opponent say 'Yes', for if he has answered 'No' for, let us say, twenty-nine hairs, and 'Yes' for thirty, it is easy to pour scorn on the suggestion that the difference between twenty-nine and thirty hairs is the difference between not having and having a beard. . . . This is clearly a piece of crooked argument which would take in no reasonable person, so long, at any rate, as it was used about beards and not about anything which engaged our emotions more strongly”13.
Example II.11.a
(From Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics, University of California Press, 2001, p.89):
“Rather than define [persons who repeatedly commit sodomy and those who do not] as a simple dichotomy, the Kinsey Reports described a continuum that ranged from individuals who had never [committed a sodomitic act], to those who had [committed some sodomitic acts], and so on through those [who regularly committed sodomy].”
II.12. Illegitimately using, or demanding, definition. (top)
An illegitimate use of definition is dealt with by pointing out to your opponent that the facts are much more complex than he may imagine. An illegitimate demand for definition is dealt with by refusing to give one, and using an alternative method of making your point clear.
Example II.12.a
From Stephane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism, Harvard University Press, 1999, p.4):
“[C]rimes against civilians . . . tend to fit a recognizable pattern even if the practices vary to some extent by regime. The pattern includes execution by various means; . . destruction of the population by starvation; . . deportation. . . . [I]t is not always easy to distinguish between events caused by fighting between rulers and rebels and events that can properly be described only as a massacre of the civilian population. Nonetheless, we have to start somewhere.”
II.13. Using questions designed to draw out self-incriminating statements that are false (also known as the use of complex questions). (top)
This is dealt with by refusing to make the statements.
The most famous example of this type of question is: Have you stopped beating your wife? The following is another example, paraphrased from two related assertions in Jim Breithaupt, Teach Yourself Physics, Hodder & Stoughton, 2002, p.223:
“Do you think the freedoms we now take for granted such as human rights and democracy would not have been won if the struggle for intellectual freedom from the dogmatism of the medieval Church had been lost?”
Clearly, either of the answers 'Yes' or 'No' implies the (false) admission that the Church hindered intellectual freedom. This trick must be met by dividing up the question and answering the different parts separately.
II.14. Arguing by mere analogy. (top)
This is dealt with by examining the suggested analogy in detail, and pointing out where it fails.
“When . . . a concrete illustration is used to create conviction of the truth of whatever it illustrates . . . it is no longer a mere illustration; it is then an argument from analogy”14.
Example II.14.a
(From Jonathan Wells, Icons of Evolution, Regnery Publishing, 2000, p.59 et seq.):
“Biologists since Aristotle have noticed that very different organisms may share remarkable similarities. One kind of similarity . . . is structural: The pattern of bones in a bat's wing is similar to that in a porpoise's flipper, though the wing is used for flying and the flipper is used for swimming. . . . In The Origin of Species Darwin argued that the best explanation for [this similarity] is descent with modification. “If we suppose that an early progenitor . . . of all mammals, birds and reptiles, had its limbs constructed on the existing pattern,” then “the similar framework of bones in the . . . wing of a bat [and] fin of the porpoise . . . at once explain themselves on the theory of descent with slow and slight modifications”.”
“Reduced to its bare bones, the argument from analogy has the form that because some thing . . . N has the properties a and b which belong to M, it must have the property c which also belongs to M. . . . The original analogy is useful as a guide as to what we may look for in . . . research; [but] the choice of analogies cannot be taken as a sure guide as to what we shall find in it”15 (emphases added).
Thus:
“A whale resembles a fish in the general shape of its body and in the fact that it lives in water. If we knew no better, an argument from analogy would lead us erroneously to suppose that the whale also resembled a fish in breathing by gills instead of lungs. There is a well-known principle in arguing from analogy that we can only safely argue from the possession of one set of characters to another if there is a causal connection between them. Even this principle would not, however, save us from error here . . . because the possession of gills is causally connected with the fact of living in water. This just happens to be a character in which whales differ from fishes”16.
So, even if it were demonstrated that bats are descended from a prototypical organism, that is no proof that the porpoise is descended from the same ancestor.
Example II.14.b
(From “Breakthrough of the Year: Evolution in Action”, Science Magazine, 23/12/05)
“One of the most dramatic results came in September, when an international team published the genome of our closest relative, the chimpanzee. With the human genome already in hand, researchers could begin to line up chimp and human DNA and examine, one by one, the 40 million evolutionary events that separate them from us.
The genome data confirm our close kinship with chimps: We differ by only about 1% in the nucleotide bases that can be aligned between our two species, and the average protein differs by less than two amino acids. But a surprisingly large chunk of noncoding material is either inserted or deleted in the chimp as compared to the human, bringing the total difference in DNA between our two species to about 4%” (emphasis added).
Again, similarity is no proof of ancestry.
II.15. Arguing by forced analogy (i.e. where there is insufficient resemblance between the things compared). (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out how many other analogies supporting different conclusions might have been employed.
Example II.15.a
(From Dr. Fred Schwarz, You can Trust the Communists, Prentice-Hall, 1960, pp.161-2):
“Communist theory taught that . . . [when the Communists] had eliminated all possible counter-revolutionary elements of the old regime, the [State] could become less rigid and more benign, and begin to wither away. . . . Bukharin thought that the State was not withering away because it was growing stronger whereas, according to Stalin, the fact that the State was growing stronger was the . . . proof that it was withering away. . . . When a baby is born, it immediately begins to wither, but the process of withering demands growth to maximum strength” (emphasis added).
“When one finds oneself driven to belief by a well-worded analogy like that . . . one can begin by examining how close the analogy is. Realizing that it is not at all close, one can try other analogies”17.
For example, why should 'capitalism' not wither away after growing to maximum strength, instead of requiring a violent Socialist revolution that destroys the 'bourgeoisie'? Alternatively, why is the Socialist State like a withering baby (a natural person) and not like a more enduring corporate entity (a legal person) such as a bank?
Example II.15.b
(From Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on Trial, 2nd ed., InterVarsity Press, 1993, p.11):
“[Evolutionist Harvard Professor Stephen Jay] Gould wrote [that] evolution is . . . a fact of nature, as well established as the fact that the earth revolves around the sun.”
Taken on its own, with no supporting evidence, this statement is nothing more than argument by analogy. Gould attempts to introduce into the reader's mind an association between the proposition in dispute – the fact of evolution – and one which is not in dispute – the fact of the Earth's revolving around the sun. This statement is no proof at all, even though it is often combined with trick III.C.3. To illustrate this we can substitute in this sentence an alternative for evolution which may be less likely to be accepted:
“Telepathy is a fact of nature, as well established as the fact that the earth revolves around the sun.”
II.16. Using the fallacy of non-essence. (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out that, although certain conditions are satisfied, the desired conclusion is not, because these conditions are not of the essence of the central fact asserted.
Example II.16.a
(From Catholics: Britain's Largest Minority, p.167):
“His solution is to live as a Catholic and worship as a Catholic, but at the same time to simply ignore the Church's proscription of [sodomy].”
Earlier on in the same passage, the person being described is quoted as saying:
“'I believe in God, I believe in the Incarnation, I believe in almost all the dogmas of the Church'.”
In example III.B.8.a we see that, for convenience's sake, Catholics are traditionally defined as people who accept the Rule of Faith – i.e., all the dogmas of the Church. As mentioned in that point, this is purely a matter of words, but it does help us distinguish that specific body of people known as 'Catholics' from every other person on the planet. Otherwise, at what point do we stop allowing heresy to exist 'within' the Church? “I believe in God, but not the Incarnation” - a Mohammedan could say as much. What is highlighted here is that particular beliefs are only accidental to the faith of a Catholic: the essential characteristic of a believer is his or her acceptance of the whole of the Faith.
II.17. Using a restricted range of sources of information. (top)
This is dealt with by recognising the need to refer to as many different sources as possible, or, better still, to research the facts directly yourself (if you are able), in order to best inform yourself as to the truth of the matter.
The reader may be familiar with this piece of advice, having perhaps heard it from a teacher at school or a lecturer at university. What we are drawing attention to here, however, is not so much a trick that will be encountered in a particular debate, but to the dangers of relying on the selective presentation of information from a few restricted sources of predigested material. Such is the possibility of relying on television and the press. If we imagine that in Britain there are only a handful of TV stations and daily newspapers, all of which, quite naturally, reflect a particular editorial policy, we can see that not only are we at risk of receiving skewed data on any particular topic under discussion, we are also at risk of receiving a skewed selection of topics for discussion. For example, from which of the mainstream media would we hear that:
“Christians form the most persecuted religious group in the world”18?
The biased reporting of facts is a perfectly natural consequence of the tendency which exists in all of us to filter data based on what we ourselves regard as important. If the controllers of television stations and the press do not have a Catholic worldview, they will not select information that would tend to reinforce that worldview, nor would they be shy of publishing blasphemous or heretical material, whether intentionally or otherwise.
The need for unbiased information becomes even more imperative when we come face-to-face with active propagandising by our opponents:
“Success depends, as always, on flooding the media”19.
II.18. Presenting a false dichotomy. (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out that the suggested alternatives are not mutually exclusive or not exhaustive or not either.
Example II.18.a
(From Anne Hendershott, The Politics of Deviance, Encounter Books, 2002, p.78):
“A recent headline in the Seattle Times [ran]: “Pope Deplores Pedophilia, But Won't Lift Priest's Celibacy”.”
This false dichotomy speaks for itself.
Example II.18.b
(From Phillip E. Johnson, The Wedge of Truth, InterVarsity Press, 2000, p.141):
“Is there an alternative to Darwinism? When Darwinists ask that question, they have in mind an alternative of the same kind, meaning a[n] . . . explanation that involves only law[s of nature] and chance. . . . Many persons have tried to find such a theory by postulating . . . vaguely-defined self-organizing systems or chaos theory or new laws of physics. None of this ever comes to anything more than unkept promises, which is why neo-Darwinism retains its status as the default position. If nature is all there is, and matter had to do its own creating, then there is every reason to believe that the Darwinian model is the best model we will ever have of how the job might have been done. To confirmed materialists . . . that means that the theory has to be accepted as true regardless of all the reasons to believe that it is false. To me it means that there is good reason to conclude that materialism is false.”
Johnson's argument here relies on the fact that while, as a matter of logic, two opposing alternatives cannot both be true, they can both be false. Thus the Darwinist position he describes presents a false dichotomy between Darwinism on the one hand, and a 'better explanation' on the other. The verbal trick here is that the word 'better' implies that Darwinism is at least a 'good' explanation; but that is begging the question (trick II.6).
II.19. Using a non sequitur. (top)
This fallacy involves asserting a conclusion that does not follow logically from the given premisses, sometimes having no connection at all with them. The difference between the post hoc and non sequitur fallacies is that in the former there is no causal connection, whereas in the latter there is no logical connection. A non sequitur argument also differs from the fallacy of irrelevant objection. In the latter, the argument being made relates to a question other than the one under discussion. In a non sequitur argument the premisses may be relevant, but the suggested relationship is not logical.
Example II.19.a
(From Harold Berman, Law and Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1983, pp.295-6):
“Feudalism was said to be that type of society which had existed in the West during the Middle Ages; more than that, it was said to be a type of society that had existed in non-Western cultures as well, during the “medieval” period of their history. This usage conceals an ethnocentric assumption that certain characteristics of Western social and economic history may also be taken to define the social-economic order of other societies. . . . Marxist historians, in particular, who treat the mode and relations of production as the . . . base of feudal society, and the politics, ideology, and law as a superstructure [derived therefrom] have failed to show why Western feudalism produced a fundamentally different kind of superstructure from that produced by, say, Japanese or Russian feudalism.”
The non sequitur employed here is as follows:
Marx purported to discover a 'scientific' law of history according to which mankind passes through certain predictable economic phases, including feudalism, on the way to the Communist Promised Land;
the history of Japan includes a period which we call 'feudal'; therefore,
the history of Japan proves the validity, and therefore the scientific quality, of Marx's law.
The dishonesty of this argument, which also relies on trick III.B.8, is exposed by comparing the exact nature of the Japanese and Western feudal societies and showing thereby that:
there is no logical connection between the feudal economies of Western Europe and Japan and any of the other important contemporary social structures of these societies;
Marx's 'law' required such a logical connection in order to be of any scientific value; therefore,
this non sequitur invalidates Marx's proposition.
II.20. Using vicious abstraction. (top)
This involves removing a statement from its context, thereby changing its meaning. It is dealt with by pointing out the omission.
A simple example of this fallacy is the famous misquotation of St. Paul, “Money is the root of all evil”, which abstracts from the actual reading of Scripture: “'The love of money is the root of all evils' (1 Timothy 6:10).
III.A.1. Attributing prejudices or motives to one's opponent. (top)
This is dealt with by pointing out that alternative prejudices may just as easily underlie the opposing view, and that, in any case, the reason why a person holds an opinion is an entirely different matter from the question of whether or not that opinion is correct.
To the irrelevant question, “Are you a Catholic?”, the proper reply is not, “No”, or, “I may be a Catholic, but my equally pro-life colleague is not”; rather, the irrelevancy itself should be pointed out by a reply such as, “Are you a hedonist/Communist/atheist (etc.)?”.
Having allowed for the existence of potential prejudices on either side of the argument, the matter still requires to be resolved: is x in fact right or wrong?
III.A.2. Alleging or proving hypocrisy. (top)
This is dealt with by admitting the charge of hypocrisy where it has been proved, but pointing out its irrelevance to the truth of the matter in dispute.
(See the quotation from St. Augustine's On the Sermon on the Mount in point III.C.13.)
III.A.3. Using abusive personal (ad hominem) attacks. (top)
This is dealt with by asking your opponent either to adopt a more civil tongue or to leave the room. Alternatively, if he is bigger than you, consider whether or not it would be more prudent for you to leave the room. (See also Aristotle's advice in the introduction about when not to debate with a person.)
This is a degeneration of the previous trick in which the person using it no longer even attempts to disguise his attack as a pertinent point (e.g. “You only do what the Pope tells you to do”), but simply insults his opponent.
(See example III.C.22.a for an illustration of this tactic.)
III.B.1. Making a statement in which 'all' is implied but only 'some' is true. (top)
This is dealt with by putting the word 'all' into the proposition, thereby showing it to be false.
Example III.B.1
(From Dennis Sewell, Catholics: Britain's Largest Minority, Penguin Books, 2001, p.165):
“The conviction that the Church is wrong about contraception has led the younger generation to question other aspects of moral teaching.”
In this statement, the author clearly intends the reader to understand that the entire younger generation is opposed to the Church's teaching on contraception. Such an extreme claim, when exposed, would be virtually impossible to maintain, and could be refuted by just one contrary example.
III.B.2. Extending an opponent's proposition by contradicting or misrepresenting it (also known as the straw man argument). (top)
This is dealt with by restating your actual argument.
Example III.B.2
(From Leonard Peikoff, “Abortion Rights are Pro-Life”, Religion vs Morality, The Ayn Rand Institute, 2000):
“The anti-abortionists’ attitude, however, is: “The actual life of the parents be damned! Give up your life, liberty, property and the pursuit of your own happiness.””
This straw-man caricature of the Catholic pro-life position (as opposed to the author's deliberately confused use of the term “pro-life” here – see trick III.B.8) implies that, after childbirth, parents become the legal property of their children, and that abortion is a declaration of independence from them. A proper response to this claim is to tell one's opponent to grow up.
III.B.3. Evading a sound refutation of an argument by using a sophistical formula. (top)
This is dealt with by analysing the formula to show its unsoundness.
“[A] sophistical formula that is never an honest argument is the common use of the phrase 'the exception proves the rule'. . . . This is obviously a dishonest evasion. It can be dealt with by pointing out (as is self-evident) that exceptions do not prove that a general rule is true but that it is false. [It may also be pointed out] that the word 'prove' in this old saying originally had the meaning 'test', and that it is true that the way to test a general rule is to look for exceptions to it, whereas it is not obviously the case that finding exceptions 'proves' the rule in the modern sense of showing that the rule is a correct one.”20
Example III.B.3
(From Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on Trial, 2nd ed., InterVarsity Press, 1993, p.148):
“[The philosopher Karl Popper observed that acceptance of either Marxism or Freudian psychoanalysis had] 'the effect of an intellectual conversion or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refused to see it, either because it was against their class interest, or because of their repressions which were still 'un-analyzed' and crying aloud for treatment'. . . .
Popper saw that a theory that appears to explain everything actually explains nothing. If wages fell this was because the capitalists were exploiting the workers, as Marx predicted they would, and if wages rose this was because the capitalists were trying to save a rotten system with bribery, which was also what Marxism predicted. A psychoanalyst could explain why a man would commit murder – or, with equal facility, why the same man would sacrifice his own life to save another. According to Popper, however, a theory with genuine explanatory power makes risky predictions, which exclude most possible outcomes. Success in prediction is impressive only to the extent that failure was a real possibility.”
III.B.4. Diverting to another question, to a side issue, or making an irrelevant objection. (top)
This is dealt with by refusing to be diverted, restating the original terms of the dispute.
“There is indeed a danger that any reference to the crooked thinking in an argument may be a diversion from a proper consideration of whether the conclusion of the argument is true or false.”21 (A warning not to become too absorbed in the analysis of crooked thought!)
Example III.B.4.a
From Robin le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, Routledge, 1996, p.14 et seq.):
“The problem with [the cosmological argument for the existence of a creator] is that [it] necessarily represent[s] the first cause as being something utterly unlike ordinary causes. Our ordinary notion of causation is bound up intimately with the notion of time. Causes take place at particular moments of time, and before their effects. A first cause, however, would have a completely different relationship to time. So different, in fact, that we have to admit that the universe cannot be said to have a cause in the ordinary sense of the word.”
This exercise in pedantic semantics (quibbling over the meaning of words) is also an example of trick III.B.7. The author is attempting to refute the fact of a first cause of the universe by insisting that his definition of the word 'cause' is the only one that may properly be used.
III.B.5. Using a red herring. (top)
Another term for an irrelevant objection is a “red herring”, “so called because hunters sometimes drag a red herring, a particularly smelly fish, to obscure their own scent”22.
“Don says that buying a Mercedes is immoral, because many people are homeless and hungry. . . . Michelle disagrees. Among other things, she argues that spending money on expensive toys is perfectly legal. She asks, “What would you do? Throw Mercedes owners in jail? Execute them? Reeducate them?” But the legality of extravagance is a red herring. Punishment is also a red herring. The debate is about whether extravagant expenditure is moral or immoral, not about whether it is legal or illegal or whether it ought to be punished.”23
Example III.B.